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ABSTRACT
Intergovernmental disputes involving water allocation
and the environment are widespread and impose costs
and uncertainties on water users, communities, and
governments. This article presents criteria for evaluating
different types of efforts to resolve disputes. The criteria
were developed after extensive analysis of several dozen
interjurisdictional disputes involving water allocation and
environmental quality. These criteria are used to examine
the strengths and weaknesses of litigation, negotiated
agreements, and market transactions as tools for effecting
changes in water allocation and management needed to
resolve transboundary disputes.
INTRODUCTION
Interjurisdictional water disputes frequently involve
environmental issues, and are costly and widespread in
the western United States (the location for the cases on
which this research is based). In the American West, state
and local governments, irrigation districts, Native
American tribes, and federal agencies are embroiled in
intergovernmental disagreements involving water and the
environment. Some widely publicized examples include
the Mono Lake conflict in California which involves the
City of Los Angeles, the State of California, several
federal agencies, local irrigators, and environmental
organizations in a complex dispute over maintaining
stream flows and lake levels (Dunning 1994). The Wind
River conflict in Wyoming has been ongoing for decades
and involves the State of Wyoming, the Wind River
Arapaho and Shoshone Tribes, several irrigation districts,
and multiple federal agencies in a conflict over
jurisdictional authority and over managing the river to
enhance instream flows (Checchio and Colby 1992).
Ongoing conflicts over endangered species and
management of the Edwards Underground Aquifer in
Texas, the Carson-Truckee River Basins in Nevada, the
Colorado River Basin, and the Columbia River provide
other examples of interjurisdictional disputes over water
and the environment (National Research Council 1992).
These conflicts impose numerous costs on disputants, on
the communities in the affected regions, and on
taxpayers. These costs include the direct expenses of
litigation and negotiation to resolve the conflicts; ongoing
uncertainties for water users and other economic actors in
the regions; loss of morale and organizational credibility
as conflicts continue unresolved; poor intergovernmental
relationships; and lack of coordination on other regional
problems. In addition, there generally are environmental
costs as species and habitats deteriorate while the dispute
continues.
This article focuses on only one of many components
necessary for resolving these types of disputes – changes
in water management and water allocation. Typically,
environmental water disputes in the western United
States are stimulated by a need for additional water to
support endangered fish, riparian habitat, lake levels, or
wetlands. Rarely is surplus water available and
consumptive water users resist efforts to reallocate some
of their water to accommodate environmental demands.
Two broad categories of mechanisms are available to alter
water allocation and management: voluntary agreements
negotiated among the disputants and compulsory changes
in water use and management mandated by courts,
administrative agencies, and legislatures. A purely
voluntary approach could include purchasing water rights
from willing sellers to improve stream flow levels or
providing technical and financial assistance to promote
water conservation. A purely compulsory approach could
involve litigation and administrative actions to alter water
diversions, change upstream dam releases, and to
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mandate improved irrigation practices. Under the broad
category of voluntary reallocation mechanisms, there are
several types of tools: market transactions, negotiated
agreements, incentive pricing to spur conservation, and
cost sharing of technical assistance to induce desired
changes in water management. Compulsory mechanisms
follow the three branches of the United States
government: court orders, administrative actions, and
legislative mandates. While there are important
distinctions between voluntary and compulsory
approaches, they often work in a complementary manner
to resolve interjurisdictional disputes.
Voluntary and compulsory reallocation mechanisms have
different strengths and weaknesses as tools to resolve
transboundary disputes. This article evaluates these
mechanisms using criteria developed for comparative
analysis of western United States water disputes. The
paper concludes with suggestions for more effective use
of these mechanisms and for strengthening the efficacy of
voluntary strategies to accomplish changes in water
management necessary to resolve transboundary conflicts.
THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY AND
COMPULSORY MECHANISMS
In the western United States, voluntary and compulsory
water reallocation mechanisms have frequently been used
to assist resolution of transboundary environmental water
conflicts. While the boundaries in the cases discussed in
this paper are interstate, state-tribal, and local
jurisdictional boundaries, the cases may provide some
insights useful for international water disputes.
As an example of voluntary approaches, negotiated
agreements have proved central to resolving disputes over
water between Native American tribes and non-Indian
water users. For instance, the Salt River Pima Maricopa
Water Rights Settlement in Arizona relies upon complex
multiparty exchanges of water, modified operation of
public water projects, water leasing, and financial
transactions in order to satisfy the needs of the different
stakeholders. After years of negotiations within Arizona,
an agreement was reached and was ratified by Congress
in 1988 (Checchio and Colby 1992). Other negotiated
agreements that involve tribal water disputes and
voluntary water sales, exchanges, and leases include the
Carson-Truckee Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement
(ratified by Congress in 1990), and the Fort Hall Indian
Water Rights Settlement in Idaho (also ratified in 1990).
The Carson-Truckee Settlement uses economic incentives
to further urban water conservation. The agreement
requires urban water providers to install water meters and
charge their customers based on the volume of water used
(Checchio and Colby 1992).
Turning to examples of compulsory mechanisms, a 1989
Ninth Circuit Court ruling reallocated Stampede
Reservoir on the Truckee River system from urban supply
to fishery restoration. This involuntary water reallocation
motivated the urban interests that had relied upon
Stampede Reservoir to negotiate in earnest with the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and other fishery advocates.
The resulting 1990 settlement addresses many aspects
(though not all) of long-standing conflicts over regional
water use (Checchio and Colby 1992). 
Administrative actions also have forced changes to assist
in resolving interjurisdictional water disputes. The new
operating rules for Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado
River promulgated by the United States Department of
Interior in 1987, for instance, addressed a dispute among
states, tribes, federal agencies, and hydropower users over
managing the dam to accommodate environmental and
recreational needs along with hydropower production
(National Research Council 1996).
Legislative bodies also take actions to resolve
intergovernmental disputes. For instance, the Texas
legislature acted in 1993 to create a regulatory framework
for managing groundwater pumping in response to
ongoing litigation over endangered species dependent on
the waters of the Edwards Aquifer. That legislation has
encountered numerous impediments to implementation as
irrigators resist regulation of their pumping. The
legislation does provide for voluntary acquisitions of
water from willing sellers to ease the burden of
accommodating endangered species, urban growth, and
agricultural water needs (Edwards Aquifer Act 1993).
In summary, both compulsory and voluntary mechanisms
have proved valuable in implementing changes in water
allocation to assist resolution of water-related
environmental disputes. In the next section, the strengths
and weaknesses of compulsory and voluntary mechanisms
are compared.
COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY
STRATEGIES
Comparative evaluation of reallocation mechanisms
requires criteria. The eight criteria presented here were
developed after examining dozens of complex
interjurisdictional water conflicts in the western United
States, many of which have extended over several decades
(d'Estrée and Colby 2000b; Checchio and Colby 1992;
National Research Council 1992). The criteria were
developed as part of a framework for evaluating “success”
in resolving environmental disputes, including
comparison of litigation, administrative remedies,
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legislation, and negotiated agreements as dispute
resolution mechanisms.1
There are several reasons to evaluate strategies that can
assist dispute resolution by altering water allocation and
management. Policymakers and the public require
accountability for the manner in which water conflicts are
resolved. Public agencies often are stakeholders in
conflicts. Public resources are expended in grappling with
conflicts and issues of public interest – such as water
quality, endangered species, and management of public
water projects – frequently are the subject of the disputes.
Public officials want to know how much money, time,
and other resources were expended, and whether the costs
incurred were justified by the positive outcomes of the
dispute resolution process. In addition to providing
accountability to elected officials and the public,
evaluation also assists in learning which strategies most
effectively resolve disputes.
The first four criteria involve economic considerations.
Research on case study disputes indicates that these
economic criteria are difficult to apply to actual cases
because case-specific record keeping by disputants on
costs and benefits is not yet common and some financial
information is confidential. Nevertheless, these criteria
are presented here in the hope that systematic
documentation of disputes (as developed and applied in
d'Estrée and Colby 2000b) will make it possible to apply
these criteria more rigorously to cases in the future.
Different levels of conceptual and empirical rigor can be
invoked to economically evaluate a particular dispute
resolution process. In order to determine whether a
particular dispute resolution process and the outcome
achieved is “worthwhile,” it would be necessary to
identify all current and future benefits, to quantify them
in dollars, and then to weigh the benefits against the
costs. If the benefits were found to outweigh the costs,
then the process and outcome could be characterized as
worthwhile in the sense that they returned more in
benefits than were expended in costs. If one wishes to
document that the process used was the best possible
process for the case, it would be necessary to estimate
what the costs and benefits would have been if an
alternative process had been used, and the likely
outcomes of alternative processes. This could involve
comparing actual litigation to a hypothetical negotiated
agreement, for instance. This sort of counterfactual
comparison may be possible in some cases, but
construction of a hypothetical process and outcome is
fraught with difficulties. Another approach is to examine
actual costs and benefits in parallel sets of similar cases
that were resolved using different processes. Such
rigorous inquiry is not currently possible given the
absence of comparable data across similar cases resolved
using different mechanisms. Over time, with a
sufficiently large number of carefully documented cases,
it will be possible to say more about the costs and benefits
of litigation, negotiated transactions, administrative
actions, and other means to resolve environmental
disputes.
The criteria discussed here focus on costs, although the
criteria perceived economic efficiency considers
stakeholders views on whether benefits outweighed costs.
Analysis of cases indicates that quantification of dispute
resolution benefits (such as improved working
relationships and reduced hostility) is very difficult.
D'Estrée and Colby (2000a) take the approach of
characterizing benefits in descriptive terms rather than
quantitatively. Costs are a key concern in resolving
interjurisdictional water disputes and three criteria related
to costs are discussed here: costs of the process used to
achieve some form of resolution (a court ruling, market
transaction, legislative mandate, or negotiated
agreement), cost effectiveness in implementing the
outcome, and the distribution of process and
implementation costs among the stakeholders.
The first criterion discussed here is “reasonable” process
costs. Process costs include money, staff time, and other
resources expended to achieve resolution of a dispute
through a voluntary agreement, litigation, or other
means. Costs are reasonable if they are in proportion to
the magnitude of the problem that is the subject of the
dispute and the values at stake. While litigation has the
reputation of being expensive relative to other strategies,
preliminary cost data from water conflicts in the western
United States are inconclusive due to incomplete data on
costs incurred by public agencies and stakeholders.
Process costs may be similar in litigation and negotiation
processes because pursuit of a voluntary agreement often
is accompanied by preparations to litigate in the event
that negotiations break down, and to provide a credible
threat of legal action in order to further negotiations.
Data sometimes is available with which to evaluate the
reasonableness of process costs. For instance, the most
recent phase of a fourteen year dispute between Kansas
and Colorado involves awarding damages to Kansas for
Colorado's overuse of an interstate river. The economic
value associated with the overuse by Colorado is
estimated at $60-80 million. The Colorado legislature has
authorized expenditure of $11 million to defend
Colorado's position in the case (Water Strategist 1999,
p.12). Colorado can benefit from this expenditure in
several ways. Legal and economic expertise retained with
these funds may succeed in minimizing the compensatory
payments required to be paid to Kansas, protecting
Colorado water users access to interstate waters, and
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setting precedents beneficial to Colorado in future
disputes. It is too early to ascertain whether benefits will
outweigh Colorado’s expenditures.
Any outcome that is achieved, whether through litigation
or negotiations, must be implemented in order to address
the environmental issues in dispute. Cost effectiveness
examines whether implementation is accomplished in a
least-cost manner, given alternative methods available to
make more water available for environmental needs and
to accomplish other implementation goals. With respect
to cost-effective implementation, implementation costs
may be higher under court rulings because courts are not
required to consider costs as an element in crafting their
ruling. Rather, courts are focused on rights and on
consistency with the existing body of law (Horowitz
1977). In contrast, legislative mandates, administrative
actions, and agreements negotiated among stake holders
are likely to carefully weigh costs for several reasons:
because of a political desire to limit financial burdens on
taxpayers, firms, and property owners, and because those
parties negotiating the agreement will be bearing some or
all of the costs themselves.
Only anecdotal and incomplete data is available on
process and implementation costs for a cross section of
cases, so hypotheses about the relative costs of litigation
and negotiated agreements cannot be verified empirically.
Cost comparisons are further confounded by the fact that
stakeholders receive different outputs for the money they
invest in different processes. In litigation, the most
desirable payoff for those seeking to resolve a dispute is
a ruling that favors their position in the particular case at
hand and that also has strong precedential value
enhancing their position in future disputes. In market
transactions, the payoff is acquisition of the water needed
to resolve a specific dispute. Different strategies buy
different goods and so it is difficult to meaningfully
compare the magnitude of process and implementation
costs across cases resolved in different ways.
In light of difficulties with documenting and quantifying
costs and benefits, perceived economic efficiency is used
as a criteria to assess whether stakeholders believe that
the benefits they experience outweigh the costs for a
particular dispute resolution process and outcome. This
criterion also relies upon independent economic analyses
of the case to indicate how social benefits compare to
social costs. Independent analyses for specific cases
sometimes are conducted by academic researchers or by
a federal agency with watchdog responsibilities – such as
the United States General Accounting Office, the
Congressional Budget Office, or the Office of
Management and Budget. Preliminary data suggest that
litigation is rarely perceived as economically efficient,
except from the winner’s perspective, and that negotiated
agreements are perceived as worthwhile by the
signatories.
Financial Feasibility considers the mechanisms used to
provide money for implementation and different parties’
ability to pay their share of the financial costs incurred to
implement a solution. In general, litigation determines
costs that must be paid by specific litigants, who then
must decide how to raise the money. The courts do not
concern themselves with financial mechanisms because
such issues fall outside the legal matters that are their
focus. Negotiated agreements, in principle, could identify
the most advantageous financial mechanisms collectively
available to cover implementation costs. Some
stakeholders (municipalities for instance) can issue
bonds; others (tribes, irrigation districts) may be eligible
for low cost federal loans. To date, however, negotiated
agreements generally have not dealt with financing issues
and more attention to this matter would be beneficial.
Voluntary and compulsory approaches do appear to differ
significantly with respect to fair distribution of costs
among parties. In a voluntary process, the initial costs of
getting the process started fall on those parties seeking to
resolve the conflict. They must call the relevant
stakeholders together, initiate a bargaining process, and
offer financial (or other) inducements to persuade right
holders to sell or lease their water, or to consent to
changes in dam operations and water management. In a
litigation framework, the burden of initiating litigation
also falls on those who most urgently seek to resolve the
conflict. However, once the legal process is set in motion
and begins to be taken seriously by affected parties, they
too must spend money on attorneys, experts, and court
costs. The cost burden is spread among the stakeholders,
providing impetus to settle the problem. Perceptions of
fairness regarding cost distribution vary among
stakeholders.
Flexibility is another criterion for evaluating water
reallocation strategies used to settle disputes. Ideally, any
water management regime (new operating criteria for a
dam, for example) that results from a dispute resolution
process will be responsive to changing conditions,
unexpected events, and to the changing needs of
stakeholders, the site, and the species that are the subject
of the dispute. For instance, some disputes involve
restoration of riverine ecosystems and fish species. This
may require flows that vary seasonally and flood flows
every few years to mimic the natural hydrograph.
Negotiated agreements, legislative solutions, and agency
actions are likely to consider such specific environmental
needs, if necessary to resolve the dispute. Negotiated
solutions typically consider drought in regions that have
experienced drought previously. Court rulings, on the
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other hand, are unlikely to mandate responsiveness to
changing resource needs over time. Further litigation may
ensue if the actions the court orders prove inflexible over
time. While market transactions introduce a desirable
element of flexibility, traditional market purchases of
water rights may not be sufficiently flexible to address
disputants’ environmental concerns beyond improved
baseline stream flows. For disputes in which restoring a
wetland or a species is a key issue, complex agreements
with upstream dam operators and irrigation districts may
be needed to manage rivers in ways that mimic natural
conditions in terms of flow levels, water temperature, and
flood magnitude and frequency.
Incentive compatibility in the signals created by a dispute
resolution process and its outcome also is a criterion to
evaluate changes in water management and allocation.
Incentive compatibility means that the negotiated
agreement, court ruling, or legislation generates signals
that promote, rather than obstruct, water use patterns that
are consistent with resolving the conflict. For instance,
water prices set by an administrative agency can be
compatible with resolving a conflict over regional water
scarcity if prices are structured to encourage water
conservation. Subsidized water prices, or failure to link
water costs to volume of water used, would not be
incentive compatible with resolving a dispute in a water-
scarce region. Market transactions create incentives in the
form of a known market price for water rights. The
market price signals water users that water has value
beyond their own immediate use of it. Irrigators, for
example, will realize that on-farm water conservation
may enable them to sell or lease the water no longer
needed for irrigation – providing an incentive for more
efficient water use. Judicial processes send a different
type of incentive signal – deterring violation of
established environmental policies that would land the
violator in court, with its attendant costs and
uncertainties. 
Another important criterion for comparing different
mechanisms to resolve a conflict is their ability to
stimulate a paradigm shift. A paradigm shift implies a
change in the way stakeholders approach water
management and problem solving. Such shifts are
desirable to the extent that they help break up outmoded
policies and institutions that no longer are consistent with
modern demands for water to support recreation and
restore endangered species. Court rulings, which are used
as a basis for interpreting the law in future cases, clearly
can precipitate a paradigm shift. However, administrative
actions can also be paradigm shifters, as the 1990 EPA
veto of Two Forks Dam amply illustrates (U.S. EPA
1990). Market transactions can be path breaking when
the transaction is the first of its kind in a region – the first
purchase and transfer of a water right to instream flow
maintenance, for instance (MacDonnell, 1989).
Innovative transactions can pave the way for more
widespread use of the market to resolve conflicts by
forcing policy makers to clarify how water rights can be
applied to a new purpose – such as restoring a wetland.
One of the essential elements in a paradigm-shifting
event is a shift in bargaining power among stakeholders.
A court ruling favoring environmental uses of water puts
environmental advocates in a stronger bargaining
position for future negotiations. An administrative
decision protecting stream flows gives river advocates a
stronger voice in subsequent disputes over water
management. A multiparty agreement to alter dam
operations in order to assist fish recovery sends the signal
that such a change can be accomplished in other river
basins.
Improved ability to solve subsequent problems is another
criterion with important economic ramifications in
regions where stakeholders confront a series of water
management problems over time. Negotiated agreements
provide clear advantages over compulsory processes
because they engage stakeholders in identifying strategies
to resolve the conflict, debating their merits, allocating
the cost burden, and building consensus for a particular
approach. The process gives the stakeholders experience
in working together and this can make it easier to solve
the next problem that faces the group (the next drought,
the next species listing . . . ). In contrast, litigation
encourages an adversarial approach among the parties
rather than a problem-solving stance, and does not help
lay the groundwork for future cooperative efforts.
To summarize, eight criteria for comparing voluntary and
compulsory mechanisms have been introduced. Figure 1
summarizes the criteria and contrasts litigation and
negotiated transactions for each criterion.
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Figure 1: Criteria for Comparing Voluntary and Compulsory Mechanisms
Voluntary Compulsory
Criteria Negotiated Transaction Litigation/Court Ruling
“Reasonable” Process Costs controlled by participants courts not required to consider costs
Cost-effective Implementation costs considered by participants courts not required to consider costs
Perceived Economic Efficiency perceived efficient by signatories perceived efficient by “winner,” if
anyone
Financial Feasibility may specify financing financial mechanisms ignored
Fair Distribution of Costs restoration advocates distributed across litigants
Flexibility can be tailored to case needs court may not recognize disputants’
needs
Incentive Compatibility price ⇒ value of resource costs and uncertainties deter
recurrence
Paradigm Shift innovative transaction may be a
breakthrough
precedent set for future cases
Improved Ability to Solve
Subsequent Problems
builds working relationships discourages cooperation, information
sharing
EFFECTIVE USE OF VOLUNTARY AND
COMPULSORY MECHANISMS
Compulsory and voluntary mechanisms each have
advantages and limitations. In the United States, both are
available, and in fact complement one another. One of the
key observations from tracking several dozen cases
involving water and environmental conflict is the
interplay between compulsory and voluntary strategies to
resolve disputes over water use and further environmental
protection.
On the surface a market transaction and litigation may
appear to be opposite strategies. The market approach
unquestioningly accepts existing property rights and fully
compensates owners who sell their land or water.
Litigation invokes the law to force changes in water
management, and may constrain the exercise of water
rights or redefine them altogether. However, on closer
inspection, the distinctions begin to blur. Like court
rulings, market transactions can generate heated
reactions. This occurs when the transaction negatively
affects third parties even though the buyer and seller have
reached a mutually acceptable arrangement (National
Research Council 1992). Transactions frequently are
tinged with the compulsion of looming financial crisis,
litigation, or regulatory change, and so may not be purely
voluntary. Just as market purchases are not always free of
hostility, litigation is not always hostile. “Friendly
litigation,” in which an environmental organization sues
a federal agency to compel it to perform its role (to
designate critical habitat for a listed species, for instance)
has played a crucial role in many water disputes. In such
cases, the agency may have been prevented from actively
pursuing species or wetland protection due to political
pressures from water users or due to lack of staff and
funds. A lawsuit initiated by environmental advocates
gives impetus for agency action to address the
environmental problem and this may help resolve the
water dispute. Such litigation is an indispensable tool for
creating momentum to resolve environmental conflicts
over water (National Research Council 1992; Western
Water Policy Review Advisory Committee 1998).
In many dispute resolution efforts, two or more
mechanisms are used to accomplish changes in water use
and management. The interactions between market
transactions, litigation, and regulatory change often
proceed as follows in western United States water
conflicts (d'Estrée and Colby 2000b; Checchio and Colby
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1992; and National Research Council 1992). An
environmental group or a tribal government becomes
concerned with the decline in a specific resource; a
freshwater fish species, for example, and starts to
investigate the issue and to talk with water users whose
activities are affecting the fishery. The environmental
advocates find that nearby water users are content with
the status quo and have little reason to alter their water
use. The environmental or tribal advocates identify legal
grounds to litigate in order to protect the resource – such
as the Public Trust Doctrine in the 1983 Mono Lake case;
the Endangered Species Act in the Pyramid Lake case
(National Audubon 1983; Pyramid Lake Tribe v. Hodel
1989). Litigation commences. As the discovery period
proceeds, other parties become convinced that the
environmental or tribal advocates will follow through on
gaining protection for the fish and have the legal
expertise and resources to do so. The stakeholders begin
talking; some changes in water use and upstream dam
operations are proposed. Water users argue that they must
be compensated for using less water in order to benefit
the fishery. A partial agreement is worked out that
depends on public funds for water purchases, for water
conservation assistance, and to support fishery restoration
projects. The stakeholders work to achieve enabling
legislation and appropriations. Implementation of water
purchases, new water management practices, and fish
recovery projects begin. This mix of threats to compel
changes in water management through litigation,
negotiations among stakeholders, market transactions,
and legislation is quite typical of dispute resolution efforts
involving water in the western United States.
Compulsory mechanisms provide impetus for negotiated
agreements and for market transactions. Without the
threat of litigation, there is little motivation for irrigation
districts and cities to willingly alter their customary uses
of water. Both voluntary and compulsory approaches are
available in the United States. That is not the case in
much of the world. Either protective statutes on which
litigation can be based do not exist, or such statutes exist
on paper but the political will and resources to enforce
them are absent and so they are not useful in compelling
changes in water management. Environmental advocates
in much of the world must rely on voluntary agreements
and negotiated transactions to accomplish their goals. In
international disputes, there also may be no effective
forum to compel one nation to alter its water diversions
or to take other steps to address the dispute.
Consequently, voluntary mechanisms are important in
resolving water disputes among nations.
In the absence of compulsory mechanisms that require
water users to make changes needed to resolve the
dispute, the burden of negotiating water acquisitions and
changes in management practices falls on those
organizations spearheading dispute resolution efforts.
These organizations may be tribal governments,
environmental advocacy groups, public agencies, or
downstream nations suffering from water diversions by
upstream countries. Without any threat of litigation or
administrative curtailment of customary water uses,
money is the primary motive that can stimulate water
users to make changes helpful to resolving the dispute.
Costs are borne by those seeking to resolve the conflict.
Customary resource users are fully compensated at fair
market value and are free to accept or reject proposals to
use their water. They have no compulsion to come to the
negotiating table.
If voluntary transactions are to be an effective tool for
resolving disputes over water use and environmental
quality, action is needed at two levels. First, some
organization has to take the lead in pioneering water
purchases and leases that are innovative enough to meet
disputants’ needs. Examples include agreements that tie
dam releases to seasonal fishery needs, or dry-year water
contracts under which irrigation diversions can be
curtailed when stream flow levels fall below habitat
requirements. Second, laws and policies need to be
updated to make it easier to implement voluntary
agreements and transactions. For instance, in the mid-
1980s most western United States did not provide
mechanisms to acquire water rights and change their use
to maintaining lake levels and instream flows.
Environmental advocates persisted in early efforts to
transfer water rights to satisfy environmental needs,
inducing western states to create procedures to dedicate
water for environmental purposes. Policies ripe for
updating today in the United States include those
governing the uses of public project water, re-licensing of
dams, and operation of public water projects.
CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, compulsory and voluntary mechanisms
are available to accomplish changes in water allocation
and water management needed to help resolve
environmental disputes. Different strategies have
differing strengths and weaknesses. Market mechanisms
are expensive when the lurking threat of compulsory
change is absent. Market transactions require money to
buy out water right holders and costs fall upon those
seeking the change in water use. Litigation and the force
of law are cumbersome without the flexibility of
negotiated transactions and agreements tailored to the
specific needs of a case. Disputes over water and the
environment in the American West demonstrate the
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complementary use of litigation, negotiated agreements,
and market transactions to resolve disputes. This paper
argues that a successful strategy to resolve disputes over
water and environmental quality is one that has
reasonable process costs, includes realistic financial
mechanisms to cover costs, is perceived as worthwhile in
terms of benefits exceeding costs, is cost effectively
implemented, and is one for which costs are fairly
distributed. In addition, successful mechanisms to resolve
water disputes must provide the flexibility to adapt to
changing resource needs, stimulate paradigm shifts in
addressing future conflicts, and improve the disputants'
ability to resolve subsequent problems.
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ENDNOTE
1. The full body of criteria that were developed, along
with a research instrument for collecting the data needed
for evaluation, are reported in d'Estrée and Colby, 2000a.
Only a few of the full set of twenty-six criteria are
discussed here. D'Estrée and Colby, 2000b applies the
framework to case studies and compares different
resolution strategies.
